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ABSTRACT
Various Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs)
have been proposed in the literature to address the privacy
risks derived from the exposure of user locations through the
use of Location Based Services (LBSs). LPPMs obfuscate
the locations disclosed to the LBS provider using a variety
of strategies, which come at a cost either in terms of quality
of service, or of resource consumption, or both. Shokri et
al. propose an LPPM design framework that outputs op-
timal LPPM parameters considering a strategic adversary
that knows the algorithm implemented by the LPPM, and
has prior knowledge on the users’ mobility profiles [23]. The
framework allows users to set a constraint on the tolerable
loss quality of service due to perturbations in the locations
exposed by the LPPM. We observe that this constraint does
not capture the fact that some LPPMs rely on techniques
that augment the level of privacy by increasing resource con-
sumption.
In this work we extend Shokri et al.’s framework to ac-
count for constraints on bandwidth consumption. This al-
lows us to evaluate and compare LPPMs that generate dum-
mies queries or that decrease the precision of the disclosed
locations. We study the trilateral trade-off between privacy,
quality of service, and bandwidth, using real mobility data.
Our results show that dummy-based LPPMs offer the best
protection for a given combination of quality and bandwidth
constraints, and that, as soon as communication overhead is
permitted, both dummy-based and precision-based LPPMs
outperform LPPMs that only perturb the exposed locations.
We also observe that the maximum value of privacy a user
can enjoy can be reached by either sufficiently relaxing the
quality loss or the bandwidth constraints, or by choosing
an adequate combination of both constraints. Our results
contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of
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location privacy protection strategies, and to the design of
LPPMs with constrained resource consumption.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public Policy Issues—Privacy
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1. INTRODUCTION
Location Based Services (LBSs) enable users to, among
others, let their friends know where they are, find nearby
points of interest, or obtain contextual information about
their surroundings. The typical LBS implementation is such
that user locations are by default disclosed to the LBS pro-
vider. This raises privacy concerns, as location information
is known to reveal potentially sensitive private information
(e.g., visiting the mosque, church, or temple reveals religious
beliefs). A variety of Location Privacy-Preserving Mecha-
nisms (LPPMs), e.g., [6, 7, 17], have been proposed in prior
research to mitigate these concerns. To do so, these mech-
anisms obfuscate user locations before sending them to the
LBS provider.
The great majority of LPPMs in the literature are de-
signed considering a non-strategic adversary. This assumes
that the adversary is unaware of the LPPM obfuscation al-
gorithm, and that he has no prior knowledge on the users’
mobility profiles. However, both the LPPM’s internal algo-
rithm and the user mobility patterns leak information that
can be exploited by the adversary to reduce her estimation
error when locating users [21]. Hence, designs and evalua-
tions that neglect such information overestimate the level of
privacy protection offered by the LPPM.
Shokri et al. [23] proposed a framework to design LPPM
with optimal parameters considering an adversary that has
(and exploits) information on: i) the LPPM algorithm im-
plemented; and ii) the mobility profile of the user. This
framework facilitates the design of LPPMs that maximize
the location estimation error of strategic adversaries. Fur-
thermore, the framework allows users to establish a maxi-
mum tolerated quality of service loss stemming from the use
of the LPPM. The framework is suitable to model LBSs in
which users only reveal their location sporadically, i.e. sub-
sequent location exposures of the same user are assumed to
be sufficiently apart in time that it is not possible to link
them as related to the same individual. Examples of ap-
plications in which location revelations are sporadic include
check-in services [1], or services for finding nearby points of
interest [2].
The problem statement in Shokri’s framework [23] does
not consider constraints on resources utilization (e.g., band-
width, battery consumption). These are however likely to be
a concern for users in reality, since LBSs are mostly accessed
from resource-constrained mobile devices. Our first contri-
bution is to extend the framework to account for resource
limitations.
Prior research has only applied the framework to the de-
sign of perturbation-based mechanisms, i.e., LPPMs that
modify the location that is disclosed to the LBS provider.
As second contribution, we model two other popular privacy-
preserving strategies in the context of the framework. Both
types of mechanisms increase the adversary’s uncertainty
on the user’s actual position by raising the number of lo-
cations from which the user could have issued a query. In
dummy-based mechanisms [14, 16, 26] the LPPM sends fake
locations to the LBS server along with the actual user re-
quests. In precision-based mechanisms [9, 11, 25] the LLPM
decreases the precision of the disclosed location sent to the
LBS provider, so that there is a bigger geographical region
in which they user might be located.
Contrary to the perturbation-based LPPMs considered by
Shokri et al. [23], dummy-based and precision-based LPPMs
may consume more resources (e.g., bandwidth and battery)
in order to conceal the user’s location. Our third contri-
bution is a study of the trilateral trade-off between qual-
ity of service, bandwidth consumption, and privacy using
these LPPMs as case study. We find that for the consid-
ered LPPMs both quality loss and bandwidth constraints
can be traded for privacy. In fact, the maximum achievable
level of privacy can be reached either when the quality loss
constraint is sufficiently loose (as in [23]), when sufficient
bandwidth is allowed, or when an adequate combination of
both is allowed. Our simulations show that, for given band-
width and quality constraints, dummy-based LPPMs offer
better protection than precision-based LPPMs. This is be-
cause dummy-based LPPMs have more degrees of freedom
than precision-based LPPMs in choosing the cover locations,
and hence can better exploit the available resources. Fi-
nally, both dummy-based and precision-based offer a better
privacy level than just perturbation for the same quality of
service, provided that the system can tolerate the introduc-
tion of a communication overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next
section gives an overview of the state of the art in location
privacy-preserving systems design. Section 3 describes the
system and adversarial models, as well as the constraints
imposed on the design; and Section 4 revisits Shokri et al.’s
framework. We describe the linear programs to compute
different classes of resource-consuming LPPMs in Section 5,
and validate them against real data in Section 6. Finally,
we conclude in Section 7.
2. RELATEDWORK
It is widely accepted that the disclosure of location data
entails a privacy risk: Hoh et al. show that car driving traces
enable the inference of the drivers’ home addresses [13]; this
information by itself, or together with the driver’s work
place, can be used to re-identify anonymous traces [15, 10].
Furthermore, Freudiger et al. point out that a people’s mo-
bility patterns are persistent and unique [8]. Therefore, users
are identifiable by the LBS even if they only share their lo-
cation during a short period of time. Once location data
is identifiable, it may reveal a detailed picture of the per-
son’s habits, lifestyle, and preferences [3]. To counter this
threat various obfuscation-based Location Privacy Preserv-
ing Mechanisms (LPPMs) been proposed in the literature.
These mechanisms obfuscate the revealed locations and thus
prevent (or at least limit) the possible inferences that could
be made from the data.
Following the categorization proposed by Shokri et al. [21]
we briefly introduce the existing obfuscation strategies and
refer the reader to [20] for a more detailed review. Pertur-
bation-based LPPMs [12, 17] modify a user’s reported loca-
tion such that at least two users might be associated to a
location. Pseudonymization-based LPPMs regularly change
the identity with which users identify themselves to the LBS
provider, in order to prevent the linkage of two subsequent
user locations, thus preventing the adversary from recon-
structing the trajectories followed by the users of the system.
These LPPMs can be combined with hiding-based LPPMs,
which allow users to sometimes hide their location [5], fur-
ther decreasing the adversary’s capability to link location
exposures. Precision-based LPPMs [4, 9, 11, 25] reduce the
granularity of the location data revealed to the provider,
so that it is not possible to pinpoint the exact location
of a user within a geographical region. Finally, dummy-
based LPPMs [14, 16, 26] automatically generate queries
with fake position data that are indistinguishable from the
users’ real queries. Here the adversary is unable to deter-
mine whether the location associated with a query corre-
sponds to the user’s actual position, or is a decoy.
Shokri et al. have proposed methods to quantify and sys-
tematically evaluate the level of privacy provided by obfus-
cation-based LPPMs [21, 22]. They formalize the obfusca-
tion process performed by the LPPM, as well as the attack
strategies that an adversary can use to invert the location
transformations made by the LPPM. They measure privacy
as the expected error of a strategic adversary when esti-
mating the actual location of a user. This quantitative ap-
proach is a cornerstone of their LPPM design framework,
where they propose a systematic method to design LPPMs
that are optimal with respect to strategic adversaries, who
are aware of the LPPM’s internal operation and the users’
mobility profiles [23].
This framework allows users to indicate the maximum
quality loss (derived from the use of the LPPM) that they
are willing to tolerate. The design framework then outputs
a set of parameters for the LPPM that maximize the er-
ror of the adversary when attempting to locate users. Our
work builds on this framework and extends it to account for
not only quality loss, but also for limitations on bandwidth
consumption.
Finally, we note that there are other approaches to build-
ing location privacy systems that are not based on obfusca-
tion strategies and are thus out of the scope of this paper.
This includes cryptographic approaches such as those based
on Private Information Retrieval protocols [18].
3. SYSTEMMODEL
In this paper, we extend the framework by Shokri et al. [23]
to account for bandwidth constraints in Location Privacy
Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs). Therefore, we follow the
framework’s system model and definitions and augment them
when needed to account for bandwidth constraints. The fo-
cus of the framework is on user-centric mechanisms, in which
the configuration of the LPPM is decided on independently
by each user, without knowledge about other users in the
system. Thus, without loss of generality, we restrict our
model and analysis to a single user. We note that cloak-
ing mechanisms, in which the geographical region disclosed
is chosen taking into account the positioning of a set of
users [11], can also be modeled as user-centric mechanisms
because their privacy guarantees depend only on the size of
the region [24].
User model: Similarly to prior work [23] we consider that
the user moves around in a finite geographical area that is
divided into M discrete regions R = {r1, r2, . . . , rM}. Users
only expose their location r ∈ R sporadically to an LBS pro-
vider in order to obtain a service. A user’s LBS usage pat-
tern is described by her mobility profile ψ(r),
∑
r ψ(r) = 1,
a probability distribution describing her likelihood of being
at location r when querying the LBS. We make no particular
assumption on the users’ mobility patterns, i.e., we impose
no restrictions on the profiles ψ(r). As usage is sporadic, the
locations from which the user accesses the service at differ-
ent time instants are independent from each other. There-
fore, the mobility profiles only describe the frequency with
which users’ visit locations, and does not contain informa-
tion about transitions between regions.
Location privacy-preserving mechanism: The user
runs in her personal device an LPPM that transforms her
real location r ∈ R into a pseudo-location r′ ∈ R′. This
transformation is made according to a probability distri-
bution f(r′|r) = Pr(r′|r). The pseudo-location r′ is ex-
posed to the LBS provider instead of her actual location r.
Shokri et al. [23] consider that R′ = R. In this work we ex-
tend R′ to be the powerset of R except the empty set; i.e.,
R′ = P(R)−{∅}. Hence, i) pseudo-locations r′ may or may
not contain the real location r; and ii) differently from prior
work [23], in which pseudo-locations r′ are formed by one
region in R, here r′ may be formed by one or more regions
ri in R.
Adversary model: We consider that the user wants to
protect her real location towards a passive adversary that
has access to the locations exposed to the LBS. This ad-
versary could be the LBS provider, an eavesdropper of the
user-provider communication, or other LBS subscribers with
which exposed locations are shared. We assume that the ad-
versary knows the users’ profiles ψ(r), which can be inferred,
for instance, using existing learning techniques [21].
Following prior work [23] we model the adversary’s strat-
egy as a probability distribution h(rˆ|r′) = Pr(rˆ|r′). This dis-
tribution describes the probability that, given an exposed lo-
cation r′, the estimated location rˆ corresponds to the user’s
real position r. We measure the privacy loss as the adver-
sary’s expected error in this estimation rˆ given that the real
location is r. We model the adversarial error as a function
dp(rˆ, r) that depends on both the user’s privacy criteria and
on the semantics of the location [23]; as well as on the trans-
formation function f(r′|r) implemented by the LPPM. (We
provide examples of functions dp(·) that are adequate for
particular LPPMs in Section 5.)
Quality of service: Users expect to obtain relevant in-
formation from their queries to the LBS. Because the re-
sponse of the LBS to a query depends on the observed lo-
cation r′, and not on the real location r, the information
contained in the response may be of less utility to the user
than that contained in a response to a query in which r
is exposed. Given an LPPM f(·), the expected quality loss
suffered by the user can be computed as:
E[Qloss(ψ, f, dq)] =
∑
r,r′
ψ(r)f(r|r′)dq(r′, r) . (1)
In this formula ψ(r) represents the prior probability of
the user accessing the LBS from location r (i.e., according
to her mobility profile); f(r′|r) represents the probability
of exposing r′ given that the user is at r; and the function
dq(r
′, r) represents the quality loss resulting from exposing
r′ instead of r to the LBS provider. (We provide examples of
dq(·) functions adequate for particular LPPMs in Section 5.)
In layman words, E[Qloss(ψ, f, dq)] reflects the average dis-
content experienced by users when utilizing an LPPM.
We assume that the user imposes a maximum tolerable
service quality loss Qmaxloss . The LPPM output must satisfy
the constraint E[Qloss(ψ, f, dq)] < Q
max
loss .
Bandwidth constraints: The fact that Shokri et al. con-
sider R′ = R implies that the LPPM never incurs in com-
munication overhead when sending r′ instead of r. Since
we have set R′ = P(R)− {∅}, sending r′ may require more
bandwidth than sending r (e.g., if r′ is composed by sev-
eral regions in R). LBSs are mostly accessed from mobile
devices which in general have restricted connectivity and
limited resources, and hence users may want to limit the
overhead introduced by the LPPM. We extend the existing
model [23] to account for this fact by defining the expected
bandwidth overhead incurred by LPPM f(·) as:
Bcost(ψ, f, db) =
∑
r,r′
ψ(r)f(r|r′)db(r′, r) , (2)
In this formula ψ(r) and f(r′|r) have the same role as
in Eq. (1). The function db(r
′, r) represents the additional
cost in terms of bandwidth derived from exposing r′ instead
of r. (We provide examples of db(·) functions adequate for
particular LPPMs in Section 5.)
We assume that the user imposes a maximum tolerable
bandwidth Bmaxcost . As with quality loss constraints, the LPPM
must satisfy Bcost < B
max
cost .
We note that, although we only consider limitations on
communication overhead, the function db(·) can model other
constraints related to resource consumption resulting from
exposed pseudo-locations that may be formed by several re-
gions, e.g., the increase in battery consumption needed to
send more packets, or to process more responses.
Privacy: The level of privacy enjoyed by users depends
on the attack strategy deployed by the adversary. Follow-
ing the definition by Shokri et al. [21, 23] we measure the
expected privacy of the user as:
Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp) =
∑
r,r′,rˆ
ψ(r)f(r′|r)h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r) . (3)
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Figure 1: System model.
Each summand in this equation represents the probability
that the user obtains a privacy level dp(rˆ, r), when she ac-
cesses the LBS from location location r, exposes pseudo-
location r′, and the adversary estimates rˆ given the obser-
vation.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the different
elements of this model. Note that we consider that the de-
fense (resp., the attack) takes into account the attack (resp.,
the defense) implemented by the adversary (resp., the user),
as well as the user’s mobility profile and her constraints in
terms of bandwidth and quality of service.
4. A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
TO LOCATION PRIVACY
In this section we revisit the design methodology proposed
by Shokri et al. in prior work [23]. This method allows
the user to choose optimal parameters for the LPPM f(·),
given an adversary that implements the optimal attack h(·)
against this defense. Given a user mobility profile ψ(r) and
quality of service constraint Qmaxloss , the method models the
design of the optimal LPPM as an instance of a zero-sum
Bayesian Stackelberg game.
The Stackelberg competition in the context of location
privacy is stated as follows: a leader (the user), commits
first to an LPPM f(·) that satisfies the quality constraint
Qmaxloss . For this purpose the LPPM takes the user’s actual
location r as input, and outputs a pseudo-location r′. Upon
observing the exposed location, a follower (the adversary),
estimates the real location through the attack h(·), taking
into account both the user’s profile ψ(r) and the LPPM f(·)
chosen by the user. The adversary ‘pays’ an amount dp(rˆ, r)
to the user that represents the estimation error from the
adversary’s perspective, and the location privacy gain from
the user’s perspective.
Both players aim at maximizing their payoffs: the adver-
sary tries to minimize the amount to pay (i.e., minimize
her estimation error), while the user tries to maximize this
amount (i.e., maximize her location privacy). The game is
zero-sum, as the adversary’s information gain equals the pri-
vacy lost by the user, and vice-versa. It is also a Bayesian
game since the adversary only has access to probabilistic
data about the user’s real location; i.e., her information on
the user is incomplete.
4.1 Perturbation-based LPPM
Shokri et al. validate their framework by applying it to
the design of perturbation-based strategies. In this scenario
R′ = R, and hence the pseudo-locations r′ output by the
r’ 
r’ 
a) Real location b) Perturbation 
c) Dummies d) Precision reduction 
r1 r2 r3 
r4 r6 
r7 r8 r9 
r’ 
r’ 
r’ 
r’ 
r’ 
r’ 
Figure 2: Toy example (R = {r1, . . . , r9}): a) Real user
location; b) Perturbation-based LPPM R′ = R; c) Dummy-
based LPPM; d) Reducing precision-based LPPM.
LPPM are formed by one region ri ∈ R, which may or may
not be equal to the real location r. Let us consider the
toy example in Fig. 2a, in which the area R is formed by 9
regions, and where the user queries the LBS provider from
location r5. Two possible pseudo-locations r
′ are shown in
Fig. 2b, depicted in black and gray. Note that the black r’
coincides with the real user location r = r5, while the grey
pseudo-location r’= r7 does not.
Solution: We now present the linear programs developed
in prior work [23] to compute the optimal perturbation and
attack strategies f(·) and h(·). These linear programs com-
pute the theoretic equilibrium of the game described above.
The user runs the following linear program to find the
optimal parameters for her perturbation-based LPPM:
Choose f(r′|r), xr′ , ∀r, r′ that
maximize
∑
r′
xr′ (4)
subject to
xr′ ≤
∑
r
ψ(r)f(r′|r)dp(rˆ, r), ∀rˆ, r′ (5)∑
r
ψ(r)
∑
r′
f(r′|r)dq(r′, r) ≤ Qmaxloss (6)∑
r′
f(r′|r) = 1, ∀r (7)
f(r′|r) ≥ 0, ∀r, r′ (8)
The decision variable f(r′|r) represents the LPPM algo-
rithm, while xr′ represents the expected privacy of the user
(see Appendix A). The inequalities defined by Eq. (5) ex-
press the privacy constraint, ensuring that f(r′|r) is chosen
to maximize xr′ ; while the inequalities defined by Eq. (6)
express the quality constraint, ensuring that the expected
quality of service loss is at most Qmaxloss . Finally Eq. (7) and
(8) ensure that f(·) is a proper probability distribution.
On the other hand, the adversary runs the following linear
program to obtain the optimal attack function h(rˆ|r′), which
minimizes privacy when the user implements a perturbation-
based LPPM f(r′|r):
Choose h(rˆ|r′), yr, ∀r, r′, rˆ, andzq ∈ [0,∞) that
minimize
∑
r
ψ(r) yr + zqQ
max
loss (9)
subject to
yr ≥
∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r) + zqdq(r′, r), ∀r, r′
(10)∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′) = 1, ∀r′ (11)
h(rˆ|r′) ≥ 0, ∀r′, rˆ (12)
zq ≥ 0 (13)
The decision variable h(rˆ|r′) represents the adversary’s
attack strategy on the LPPM algorithm, and yr the expected
privacy of the user (see Appendix A). The variable zq acts as
shadow price for the quality. It expresses the loss (gain) in
privacy when the maximum tolerated expected quality loss
Qmaxloss decreases (increases) by one unit. We refer the reader
to Shokri’s prior work for more details on the meaning of this
variable [23]. The inequalities defined by Eq. (10) represent
constraints on privacy, ensuring that h(rˆ|r′) is chosen to
minimize privacy given the quality constraints; and Eqs (11)
and (12) ensure that h(·) is a proper probability distribution.
Finally Eq. (13) ensures that the trade-off between quality
and privacy expressed by zq is non-negative.
Quality, Bandwidth, and privacy constraints: Per-
turbation-based LPPMs output one-sized regions r′ ∈ R′ =
R. This determines the functions used to model the con-
straints imposed by the user. Since pseudo-locations and
real locations have the same size, there is no communication
overhead in the model. Therefore, the bandwidth constraint
Bmaxcost does not affect the optimization and does not appear
in the linear programs.
Furthermore, in this setting both the quality and the pri-
vacy constraints can be expressed in terms of the distance
between the exposed location r′ (resp., the inferred location
rˆ) and the actual user location r [23]. For the sake of sim-
plicity, in our experiments for perturbation-based LPPMs
we model both dq(r
′, r) and dp(rˆ, r) as the Manhattan dis-
tance between the two locations (e.g., dp(rˆ, r) = ‖rˆ − r‖1).
5. BANDWIDTH-CONSUMINGLOCATION
PRIVACYPRESERVINGMECHANISMS
In this section we model two popular families of Loca-
tion Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) in the liter-
ature that consume extra bandwidth to increase users pri-
vacy: dummy-based LPPMs, and precision-based LPPMs.
To model these strategies we extend the game-theoretic ap-
proach outlined in the previous section to also account for
bandwidth constraints. We describe two linear programs
that output the user’s optimal LPPM f(·) and the adver-
sary’s optimal attack h(·), while respecting the quality and
bandwidth constraints.
5.1 Dummy-based LPPM
Dummy-based LPPMs automatically generate dummy que-
ries that are sent to the LBS provider along with the user’s
real queries [14, 16, 26]). The dummy queries contain fake
locations and their goal is to increase the adversary’s estima-
tion error on the user’s real location, since for the adversary
all received locations are equally likely to correspond to the
user’s actual position.
A dummy-based LPPM f(r′|r) outputs pseudo-locations
r′ from R′ = P(R′) − {∅} formed by one or more non-
contiguous regions ri ∈ R, which may or may not contain
the real location r. In the toy example shown in Fig. 2c
we can see two possible outputs r′ when the user sends one
dummy query formed by two regions. The black pseudo-
location r’= {r2, r5} contains the real location r = r5, while
the grey pseudolocation r’= {r3, r8} does not. In the latter
case the LPPM no only generates decoy locations, but also
perturbs the user’s position.
Solution: The linear program to compute the optimal
dummy-based LPPM is similar to the perturbation-based
case, with one important difference: it includes a set of in-
equalities to ensure that the expected communication over-
head associated to the use of dummies does not exceed the
maximum expected bandwidth consumption Bmaxcost :
Choose f(r′|r), xr′ ,∀r, r′ that
maximize
∑
r′
xr′ (14)
subject to
xr′ ≤
∑
r
ψ(r)f(r′|r)dp(rˆ, r), ∀rˆ, r′ (15)∑
r
ψ(r)
∑
r′
f(r′|r)dq(r′, r) ≤ Qmaxloss (16)∑
r
ψ(r)
∑
r′
f(r′|r)db(r′, r) ≤ Bmaxcost (17)∑
r′
f(r′|r) = 1, ∀r (18)
f(r′|r) ≥ 0, ∀r, r′ (19)
The new inequality (17) adds the bandwidth constraint, so
that the expected bandwidth consumption does not exceed
Bmaxcost .
From the adversary’s point of view, the linear program
used to compute the optimal attack h(rˆ|r) differs from the
perturbation-based case in that we introduce a new shadow
price zb in Eq. (25). This new variable models the relation
between privacy and bandwidth in the same manner as zq
models the relation between privacy and quality. We obtain:
Choose h(rˆ|r′), yr, ∀r, r′, rˆ, zq ∈ [0,∞), zb ∈ [0,∞) to
minimize
∑
r
ψ(r) yr + zqQ
max
loss + zbB
max
cost (20)
subject to
yr ≥
∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r) + zqdq(r′, r)
+ zbdb(r
′, r), ∀r, r′ (21)∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′) = 1,∀r′ (22)
h(rˆ|r′) ≥ 0,∀r′, rˆ (23)
zq ≥ 0 (24)
zb ≥ 0 (25)
Quality, bandwidth, and privacy constraints: As
the dummy-based LPPM transmits dummy locations to the
LBS provider, the functions dq(r
′, r) and db(r′, r), which
express the constraints on quality and bandwidth, need to
take into account that pseudo-locations r′ can be composed
by several regions.
With respect to the quality of service function dq(r
′, r) we
distinguish two cases. If the actual location r is among the
regions contained in the pseudo-location r′, then the quality
loss is zero, as the user receives a response corresponding to
her real location r. Formally, dq(r
′, r) = 0, ∀r′ : r ∈ r′. If
on the other hand the real location is not within the exposed
pseudo-location, we assume that the response for the nearest
location will provide the most useful response to the user,
and thus measure the quality loss as the minimum of the
distances between the real location and each of the locations
ri contained in r
′. For instance, considering the Manhattan
distance, dq(r
′, r) = minri∈r′ ‖ri − r‖1, ∀r′ : r /∈ r′.
The bandwidth function db(r
′, r) takes into account that
the system sends and receives more traffic when dummies are
implemented. This extra bandwidth consumption may be
due to an increase in the length of the query if all dummies
are sent in one request; or to an increase in the number
of queries if dummies are sent in separate requests. In this
paper we consider that each dummy increases the bandwidth
overhead by 2 units: one unit for uploading and one unit for
downloading. Formally: db(r
′, r) = (
∑
ri∈r′ 2)− 2.
As in the perturbation-based case, the privacy function
dp(rˆ, r) considers the locations rˆ, r ∈ R and hence this func-
tion does not need to be modified.
5.2 Precision-based LPPM
Precision-based LPPMs reduce the precision of the loca-
tion exposed by disclosing a larger region [9, 11, 25]. This
makes it hard for the adversary to pinpoint the exact loca-
tion of the user. As in the previous case, the LPPM f(r′|r)
outputs pseudo-locations r′ from R′ = P(R′)− {∅}, but in
this case r′ is formed by a set of one or more contiguous re-
gions ri ∈ R that may or may not contain the real location
r. The locations contained in r′ form the region that is sent
to the LBS provider. In the toy example shown in Fig. 2d,
we can see two possible outputs r′ when the precision is
halved by exposing two regions. The black pseudo-location
r’= {r5}⋃{r6} contains the real location r = r5, while the
grey pseudo-location r’= {r7}⋃{r8} does not. In the latter
case the LPPM no only exposes decoy locations, but also
perturbs the user’s position.
Solution: The bandwidth consumed by a precision-based
LPPM strongly depends on the type of information required
by the LBS. Let us consider an LBS that returns nearby
points of interest. When the user issues a request for a
large pseudo-location r′ (i.e., with reduced precision), the re-
sponse contains more points than when the pseudo-location
is small, requiring more bandwidth. This is similar to the
dummy-based case but has different quality loss and com-
munication overhead, as explained below. Hence, the opti-
mal defense can be computed using the appropriate func-
tions dq(·) and db(·) in the linear program (Eqs (14)-(19)).
We refer to this type of systems as nearby precision-based
LPPMs.
Now consider an LBS in which the provider returns the
value of interest (e.g., traffic congestion) for a representative
location within r′. In this case the LBS response contains
just one value independently of the size of the region, and
hence diminishing the precision does not increase the band-
width consumption. This is similar to the perturbation-
based case, where there LPPM does not incur in a commu-
nication overhead, but has different quality loss as explained
below. The optimal LPPM parameters can be computed us-
ing the appropriate function dq(·) in the linear program (Eqs
(4)-(8)). We denote these systems as aggregated precision-
based LPPMs.
Quality, Bandwidth, and privacy constraints: The
quality loss introduced by precision-based LPPMs depends
on the type of system. For nearby precision-based LPPMs
there is no quality loss when the user’s actual location r is
included in r′, because the response includes the points of
interest nearest to this location, and thus dq(r
′, r) = 0, ∀r′ :
r ∈ r′. Otherwise, we measure the quality loss as the mini-
mum distance between the user location r and the locations
contained in r′ (dq(r′, r) = minri∈r′ ‖ri − r‖1, ∀r′ : r /∈ r′).
For aggregated precision-based LPPMs, in which the re-
sponse is one representative value, larger regions r′ reduce
the expected quality of service. In our experiments we mea-
sure the quality loss as the average distance from the user
location r to the regions ri ∈ R in r′, i.e., dq(r′, r) =∑
ri∈r′ ‖ri − r‖1/N , being N the number of regions in r
′.
The bandwidth consumption only increases for nearby
precision-based LPPMs. We define the function db(·), that
describes the communication cost, as db(r
′, r) = (
∑
ri∈r′ 1)−
1, and add one unit of bandwidth for each extra region ri
included in r′.
The estimation of the adversary is a location rˆ ∈ R, and
thus the privacy constraint does not need to be modified.
6. EVALUATION
The linear programs presented in the previous section out-
put optimal LPPM parameters. In this section we evaluate
the trade-off between location privacy, service quality, and
communication overhead in different types of LPPMs. For
this purpose we measure the expected Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp)
offered by an LPPM for a given mobility profile ψ(r), using
different combinations of maximum tolerable expected qual-
ity loss Qmaxloss and expected bandwidth consumption B
max
cost .
These constraints are modeled depending on the strategy
followed by the LPPMs as described in Sections 4.1, 5.1,
and 5.2. For precision-based LPPMs we distinguish between
nearby precision-based LPPMs, which incur in communica-
tion overhead but no quality loss; and aggregated precision-
based LPPMs, which do not consume extra bandwidth but
reduce the quality of service.
Existing Dummy-based LPPMs [14, 16, 26]: In these
schemes the LPPM algorithm selects a fixed number of re-
quests bu containing dummy locations. These dummy loca-
tions, which are sent to the LBS provider along with the real
request, are chosen depending on the user’s mobility profile.
The real location may be perturbed or not. We model exist-
ing dummy-based LPPMs as follows: the user sets a value for
the bandwidth consumption bu that establishes the allowed
communication overhead. Then r′ is chosen according to
the user’s mobility profile from all possible pseudo-locations
that contain bu dummies. We note that, in some proposed
systems, dummies are chosen also depending on previous ex-
posures in order to resemble realistic movements. However,
since we limit our analysis to sporadic LBSs, in which the
locations from which the user makes subsequent requests
are not correlated, we do not consider past exposures when
selecting dummy locations.
Existing Precision-based LPPMs [9, 11, 25]: In these
schemes the user sets a parameter that defines the precision
of the exposed location. The real location may be perturbed
or not. We model existing precision-based LPPMs as fol-
lows: Given that the user chooses a maximal precision re-
duction su, the LPPM selects r
′ from all pseudo-locations
containing su contiguous regions ri ∈ R, such that the fol-
lowing condition holds: ∀ri ∈ r′ : ‖ri−r‖1 ≤ su, considering
the Manhattan distance as quality loss function.
Existing attacks: Similarly to prior work [23] we evalu-
ate LPPMs with respect to Bayesian inference attacks [22].
This attack inverts the algorithm implemented by the LPPM
using the posterior probability distribution over all locations
given the user’s profile.
Optimal attacks: We also evaluate the different LPPMs
against optimal attacks. We test the performance of the
optimal LPPM towards the optimal attack output by the
framework; and the performance of existing defenses against
the optimal attack against described in prior work which we
repeat here for convenience [23]:
Minimize
∑
rˆ,r′,r
ψ(r)f(r′|r)h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r) (26)
subject to
∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′) = 1,∀r′, and h(rˆ|r′) ≥ 0, ∀rˆ, r′ (27)
6.1 Experimental setup
We use real mobility profiles obtained from the CRAW-
DAD dataset epfl/mobility [19] to evaluate the LPPMs’ per-
formance. This dataset contains GPS coordinates of approx-
imately 500 taxis collected over 30 days in the San Francisco
Bay Area.
The level of privacy offered by the LPPMs depends on
the size of the area of interest, as well as on the number of
regions M in which the area is divided. These parameters
define the size of the regions ri, and hence influence the ac-
curacy with which the adversary estimates the user location.
When the choice of parameters results in small regions ri,
the adversary can locate the user with more precision than
when regions are big (e.g., a large region of interest divided
in few regions). In the following we justify our choices for
the size of the area of interest and the number of regions
used in our experiments.
Number of regions. The number of regions has a
strong impact on the running time of the optimization be-
cause the number of possible real locations, pseudo-locations,
and estimated locations define the number of inequalities
involved in the linear programs. In our evaluation we need
to run a large number of linear programs to test a signifi-
cant sample of quality/bandwidth constraint combinations.
Hence, we need to choose an appropriate number of regions
in the area of interest to be able to run our experiments in
reasonable time.
Let us consider that the area of interest is divided with
a grid of M = α × β regions, with no particular restric-
tion on the regions’ shape or size. In the strategies con-
sidered in this paper, the number of real and estimated lo-
cations (r and rˆ) is the same, and equal to the cardinality
of R, i.e., M = card(R) = α · β. However, the number
of possible pseudo-locations depends on the strategy im-
Table 1: Performance times for different grid sizes
Perturbation-based
Grid size Mean Std % finished
2x2 0.22s (0.00 h) 0.26s 100.00
3x3 0.28s (0.00 h) 0.36s 100.00
4x4 0.39s (0.00 h) 0.34s 100.00
5x5 2.30s (0.00 h) 0.64s 100.00
6x6 16.21s (0.00 h) 5.20s 100.00
7x7 211.42s (0.06 h) 128.48s 100.00
8x8 679.58s (0.19 h) 336.75s 100.00
9x9 3437.09s (0.95 h) 1450.49s 100.00
10x10 13199.39s (3.67 h) 6660.02s 100.00
Dummy-based
Grid size Mean Std % finished
2x2 0.22s (0.00h) 0.18s 100.00
3x3 0.82s (0.00h) 0.33s 100.00
4x4 6710.29s (1.86h) 32653.84s 78.82
Precision-based
Grid size Mean Std % finished
2x2 0.29s (0.00 h) 0.10s 100.00
3x3 0.26s (0.00 h) 0.18s 100.00
4x4 0.84s (0.00 h) 0.35s 100.00
5x5 6.47s (0.00 h) 2.26s 100.00
6x6 68.51s (0.02 h) 39.74s 100.00
7x7 470.37s (0.13 h) 292.18s 96.88
8x8 1772.80s (0.49 h) 546.09s 72.84
9x9 7056.62s (1.96 h) 1570.97s 68.00
10x10 26223.24s (7.28 h) 6080.76s 63.64
plemented by the LPPM. The perturbation-based LPPM
transforms real locations into one-region pseudo-locations,
hence card(R′) = card(R). The dummy-based strategy al-
lows pseudo-locations to contain any combination of non-
contiguous locations, and we can compute the number of
possibilities for r′ as card(R′) = ∑Mi=1 (Mi ). Finally, in the
precision-based mechanisms pseudo-locations contain com-
binations of contiguous locations. For simplicity in our ex-
periments for precision-based LPPMs we limit R′ to rectan-
gular pseudo-locations (this would make the pseudo-location
r′ = {r4}⋃{r7}⋃{r8} in Figure 2 ineligible). Therefore, the
number of pseudo-locations is card(R′) = ∑α−1i=0 ∑β−1j=0 (α−
i)(β − j).
We run the linear programs on an HP ProLiant DL980
G7 server with 512 GB RAM and 8 processors Intel E7
2860 with 10 cores each (total 80 cores) using MATLAB’s
linprog() function, and MATLAB’s parallel computing ca-
pabilities. Table 1 shows the amount of time needed to com-
pute an LPPM function f(r′|r) for different grid sizes αxβ,
averaged over combinations of quality and bandwidth re-
strictions. As expected, the linear program running time
grows slower for perturbation-based LPPMs than for preci-
sion-based LPPMs, and dummy-based LPPMs quickly be-
come intractable (in fact, we could not compute any LPPM
for a 5x5 grid).
While running the experiments we also noticed that when
the size of the grid increases MATLAB’s linear program
solver could not find a solution for some of the optimiza-
tion problems. The percentage of successful optimizations
for each scenario is shown in the third column of Table 1.
We note that other linear program solvers could improve
Figure 3: Considered area in San Francisco.
Figure 4: User profile. The darker the region the higher the
probability that the user accesses the LBS from this location.
this percentage, as well as reduce the running time of the
optimization.
For performance reasons, in our experiments we choose a
grid size of 8x6 for perturbation-based and precision-based
LPPMs, and 4x3 for dummy-based LPPMs. However, we
must stress that a user only needs to run the linear pro-
gram optimization once to compute her optimal protection
strategy, and that the mobile device can outsource this op-
eration to a trusted server via a adequately secured connec-
tion. Therefore, in reality a larger number of regions can be
considered.
Area of interest size. Given a number of regions, the
size of the area of interest defines the adversary’s inference
accuracy. Consider an area of 100 Km2 divided by a 10x10
cartesian grid. The adversary can narrow his estimation of
the users’ location to at most 1 Km2. If on the other hand
the area is only 1 Km2 the the adversary can tighten his
estimation to 0.01 Km2.
In order to make our experiments meaningful we select
an area of 8× 6 Km = 48 Km2 in Downtown San Francisco
which we show in Fig. 3. We divide the area in regions using
a cartesian grid of 8x6 or 4x3, depending on the experiment.
These grid sizes allow the adversary to infer (with more or
less accuracy) the neighborhoods visited by the user. We
note that in San Francisco frequent visits to a neighborhood
may reveal sensitive information, such as sexual orientation
(Castro district), financial status (Financial district), and
cultural preferences (Haight-Ashbury).
In [23] Shokri et al. demonstrate that the trade-offs be-
tween privacy and quality constraints have the same ten-
dency for different users, and that the maximum level of
privacy achievable by the LPPM depends on the user’s mo-
bility profile. We have run experiments for many individuals
in the dataset and confirmed these results. Therefore, with-
out loss of generality, we only show results for one user. We
choose as target user the one for which more data is avail-
0 5 10 150
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Pr
iv
ac
y(ψ
,
 
f, 
h,
 d
p)
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
E[
Q l
os
s(ψ
,
 
f, 
d q
)
Privacy
E[Qloss(ψ, f, dq)
Figure 5: Perturbation-based LPPM: privacy level against
the optimal attack; and average expected quality loss.
able in the dataset, to have a good estimation of the user’s
mobility profile. The target user’s mobility profile, com-
puted using 36 295 location exposures inside Downtown San
Francisco, is shown in Figure 4.
6.2 Results
We separate our evaluation in three steps. First, we show
that the optimal dummy-based and precision-based LPPMs
designed using the framework are superior to state of the art
LPPMs. Second, we evaluate the impact of quality loss and
bandwidth overhead constraints on the privacy provided by
optimal LPPMs. Finally, we compare the optimal dummy
LPPM with the nearby precision based LPPM in terms of
privacy, bandwidth consumption and quality loss.
We note that few points are missing in the figures. This
is because MATLAB’s optimization algorithm was not able
to find the solution for these particular combinations of con-
straints.
6.2.1 Perturbation-based LPPM
For the sake of completeness we make a performance anal-
ysis of the perturbation-based LPPM used in prior work us-
ing our dataset [23]. The results are shown in Fig. 5, where
we compare the privacy offered by the optimal perturbation-
based LPPM towards the optimal attack output by the lin-
ear program, for different expected quality loss constraints.
Confirming previous results [23], we observe that when the
service quality constraint is loosened sufficiently the level of
privacy provided by the LPPM maxes out. This is because
these loose constraints allow the LPPM to choose pseudo-
locations that do not leak information that is useful for the
attack. Therefore the best estimation of the adversary is
only dependent on his prior knowledge, i.e., the user’s mo-
bility profile. Once quality constraints are sufficiently loos-
ened, the linear program does can output parameters that
do not fulfill tightly the quality constraint. As a consequence
the average expected quality loss grows slowly and stabilizes
around an optimal value that can be much smaller than the
maximum tolerated expected quality loss Qmaxloss .
6.2.2 Bandwith-consuming Optimal LPPMs vs. Ex-
isting LPPMs
Let us consider a case in which the quality loss allows the
LPPMs to perturb the real location; i.e., Qmaxloss > 0, and
thus r′ does not necessarily contain r. Given the considered
grid sizes, we observe that as soon as some communication
overhead is allowed both optimal and existing LPPMs reach
the maximum level of privacy achievable.
0 5 100
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Bmax
cost
Pr
iv
ac
y(ψ
,
 
f, 
h,
 d
p)
 
 
Existing, Bayesian
Optimal, Bayesian
Existing, Optimal
Optimal, Optimal
(a) Dummy-based LPPMs (4x3
grid). Qmaxloss = 0; no perturbation.
0 5 100
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Bmax
cost
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Nearby precision-based LPPMs
(8x6 grid). Qmaxloss = 0; no perturba-
tion.
0 0.5 1 1.5 20
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Qmaxloss
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Aggregated precision-based
LPPMs (8x6 grid). Bmaxcost = 0; no
communication overhead.
Figure 6: Comparison of Optimal and existing LPPMs and attacks.
Hence, our analysis focuses on the case where the quality
constraint does not allow for perturbation, i.e., Qmaxloss = 0.
In order to fairly compare optimal and existing algorithms
for every possible user constraint bu (resp., su), we construct
an existing dummy-based LPPM (resp., precision-based) as
described above, and evaluate its quality loss and bandwidth
overhead. These values are used as constraints in the lin-
ear programs described in Section 5, which output optimal
LPPM parameters that meet the same requirements than
their corresponding existing counterparts.
Figure 6 shows the results of the comparison depending
on the bandwidth constraint Bmaxcost . We observe that both
the optimal defense and attack perform better than their ex-
isting counterparts. Like with quality loss, if the bandwidth
constraint is sufficiently loosened the level of privacy maxes
out. Note that due to the running time of the algorithms
the dummy-based strategy is tested on a smaller grid, and
hence the maximum privacy achievable, given by the mobil-
ity profile, is lower than in the precision-based case. Finally,
the aggregate precision-based LPPM does not impose any
bandwidth overhead (see Section 5) and therefore the eval-
uation in in Fig. 6c considers different values for the quality
constraint Qmaxloss .
6.2.3 Trilateral privacy, quality, bandwidth trade-off
We now study the trade-off between privacy, quality, and
bandwidth consumption for dummy- and nearby precision-
based LPPMs. We note that the aggregate precision-based
LPPM does not impose a bandwidth overhead, and hence
its performance is similar to that of the perturbation-based
mechanism shown in Figure 5, with a slight difference in the
expected quality of service loss.
Figures 7a and 8a show the impact of quality loss and
bandwidth constraints on privacy for the optimal dummy-
and nearby precision-based LPPMs. As expected, when no
extra bandwidth consumption is allowed (Bmaxcost = 0) privacy
increases with the amount of perturbation allowed by the
quality constraint. For a given tolerable expected quality
loss Qmaxloss , relaxing the bandwidth constraint increases the
level of privacy achievable until it maxes out. Similarly,
loosening the quality constraint increases the level of privacy
for a given communication overhead.
Next we examine the trade-off between the expected qual-
ity loss E[Qloss] and expected bandwidth overhead E[Bcost]
for given combinations of Qmaxloss and B
max
cost . Recall that when
privacy maxes out, further loosening the quality constraint
slows the growth of the average expected quality loss. Simi-
larly, the more bandwidth is allowed the less expected qual-
ity loss needs to be traded-off for privacy (see Figures 7b
and 8b); and the more quality loss is allowed, the less band-
width needs to be used on average (see Figures 7c and 8c).
6.2.4 Dummy vs. Nearby Precision LPPMs
Finally, we compare dummy-based and nearby precision-
based LPPMs in a 4x3 grid. Figure 9a shows the privacy
level obtained by both algorithms for different quality and
bandwidth constraints (the former showed in the legend,
and the latter increased one unit at a time until privacy
maxes out). Unsurprisingly, in Fig. 9a we see that for the
same combination on constraints, the dummy LPPM per-
forms better in terms of its achieved level of privacy. This
is because the optimal nearby precision-based LPPM is re-
stricted to choose r′ ∈ R′ that contain contiguous regions,
while the optimal dummy-based LPPM has no such con-
tiguity restriction and can make the most of the allowed
bandwidth consumption.
With respect to bandwidth overhead, we can see in Fig. 9b
that the expected bandwidth consumption E[Bcost] of both
algorithms is the same until E[Qloss] stabilizes (i.e., when pri-
vacy maxes out). Once privacy has maxed out, the expected
bandwidth consumption stabilizes for the nearby precision-
based LPPM, but continues growing for the dummy-based
LPPM. This is because we consider rectangular contiguous
pseudo-locations in the precision-based case and therefore
there are less eligible regions than in the dummy-based case,
where there is no such restriction. For instance, in a 3x3 grid
precision-based pseudo-locations can only be formed by 1,
2, 4, 6, and 9 contiguous regions in R, while dummy-based
LPPMs can output pseudo-locations containing any com-
bination of 1 to 9 regions. Hence, even if the bandwidth
constraint is loosened, the precision-based LPPM has fewer
large pseudo-locations to choose from, and thus consumes
less bandwidth than the dummy-based strategy, which can
select more expensive alternatives.
In terms of quality loss, the dummy-based LPPM suffers
more quality degradation than the precision-based LPPM
(see Fig. 9c). This is due to the freedom of the dummy-
based strategy to select any combination of locations. This
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Figure 7: Dummy-based LPPM. (4x3 grid)
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Figure 8: Precision-based LPPM. (8x6 grid)
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Figure 9: Comparison of optimal dummy-pased LPPM vs. nearby precision-based LPPM.
allows dummy-based LPPMs to squeeze the quality con-
straint more efficiently than the precision-based strategy,
which is limited to choosing contiguous locations. The clus-
ters at the end of the lines in the figure reflect that the values
E[Qloss] and E[Bcost] fluctuate slightly once they have stabi-
lized (Fig. 9b).
7. CONCLUSIONS
Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) mit-
igate privacy risks derived from the disclosure of location
data when using Location Based Services (LBSs). Shokri et
al. proposed in prior work a framework to design optimal
LPPMs towards strategic adversaries, aware of the LPPM
algorithm and the users’ mobility patterns [23], for applica-
tions in which users only reveal their location sporadically.
The proposed framework allows users to set a limit on the
maximum tolerated quality loss incurred by the LPPM, but
it fails to capture constraints on the resource consumption
(e.g., bandwidth) introduced by some LPPM strategies, such
as sending dummies, or decreasing the precision of exposed
locations.
In this work we have extended Shokri et al.’s framework to
allow the user to specify a bandwidth constraint. Further-
more, we have modeled two popular strategies to trade-off
bandwidth for privacy: a scheme based on sending dummy
locations to the LBS, and a scheme based on reducing the
precision of the location sent to the LBS.
We have evaluated the performance of LPPMs that con-
sume bandwidth using the CRAWDAD taxi dataset. Our
results show that the optimal dummy- and precision- based
LPPMs provide more privacy than their respective naive
counterparts. Furthermore, both LPPMs perform better
than perturbation-based strategies if communication over-
head is allowed by the user, with dummy-based LPPMs be-
ing the the best choice for a given combination of quality
and bandwidth constraints. Furthermore, the results of our
simulations show that users can achieve the maximum pri-
vacy allowed by their mobility profiles by either permitting
a sufficiently large quality of service loss, or bandwidth con-
sumption, or an adequate combination of both.
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APPENDIX
A. PRIVACY DECISION VARIABLES
In this section we sketch the derivation of the privacy de-
cision variables used in the linear programs in Sections 4.1
and 5. We refer the reader to [23] for more details on the
linear programs derivation.
Recall that in the Stackelberg approach the adversary
knows the user’s choice of LPPM f(·), as well as the user’s
profile ψ(r). Hence, the adversary can compute the posterior
probability Pr(r|r′) that the user being at r when the ex-
posed pseudo-location is r′, as well as the probability Pr(r)
of observing r′ as follows:
Pr(r|r′) = Pr(r, r)
Pr(r′)
=
f(r′|r)ψ(r)∑
r f(r
′|r)ψ(r) , (28)
Pr(r′) =
∑
r
ψ(r)f(r′|r) . (29)
The goal of the adversary is to choose the estimated lo-
cation rˆ that minimizes the expected privacy of the user
conditioned to the exposed location being r′:
min
rˆ
∑
r
Pr(r|r′)dp(rˆ, r) (30)
Combining Eqs (28), (29), and (30), we can express the un-
conditional expected privacy that the user aims at maximiz-
ing as: ∑
r′
xr′ , (31)
where we have defined
xr′
.
= min
rˆ
∑
r
ψ(r)f(r′|r)dp(rˆ, r′) . (32)
Shokri et al. note that xr′ can be transformed as a series
of linear constraints xr′ ≤ minrˆ
∑
r ψ(r)f(r
′|r)dp(rˆ, r′), ∀r
and hence xr′ can be use as decision variable representing
the privacy offered by an LPPM.
Similarly, if we consider the attack h(rˆ, r′) given that a
true location is r and corresponding exposed pseudo-location
r′, the conditional expected user privacy is:∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r) . (33)
Taking into account the prior knowledge of the adversary
on the user’s profile ψ(r) the unconditional expected user
privacy can be written as:∑
r
ψ(r) yr , (34)
where
yr
.
= max
r′
∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r) . (35)
Shokri et al. note that yr can be transformed as a series
of linear constraints yr ≥ ∑rˆ h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r),∀r′ and hence
yr can be use as decision variable representing the privacy
obtained against an attack h(rˆ, r).
